

# **EXHIBIT A**

15-3118  
USA v. Boyland

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

August Term, 2016

(Argued: February 22, 2017

Decided: July 10, 2017)

Docket No. 15-3118

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

*Appellee,*

- V. -

WILLIAM F. BOYLAND, JR.,

*Defendant-Appellant.\**

Before: KEARSE, WALKER, and HALL, *Circuit Judges*.

Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of  
Andra L. Townes, *Judge*, convicting defendant on 21 counts of public-corruption-related  
18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 666, 1343, 1349, 1951(a), and sentencing him principally to 168  
months, to be followed by a three-year term of supervised release, and ordering him  
to pay \$9,410.14 and pay \$155,610.14 in restitution. On appeal, defendant challenges his  
contending primarily that the jury instructions with respect to 19 of his counts of

\*The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend the caption as set forth above.

1 conviction were erroneous in light of the Supreme Court's subsequent decision in *McDonnell v. United*  
2 *States*, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016), which narrowed the interpretation of "official act" within the  
3 meaning of the federal bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(3), as effectively incorporated in sections  
4 prohibiting *quid pro quo* corruption. The government concedes that, in light of *McDonnell*, the  
5 district court's instructions on 11 honest-services wire fraud counts were erroneous. We conclude that  
6 those instructions, to which defendant did not object at trial, do not meet the "plain error" standard;  
7 and we find no basis for reversal in defendant's other contentions.

8 Affirmed.

9 LAN X. NGUYEN, Assistant United States Attorney, Brooklyn, New  
10 York (Robert L. Capers, United States Attorney for the Eastern  
11 District of New York, Amy Busa, Assistant United States  
12 Attorney, Brooklyn, New York, on the brief), *for Appellee*.

13 JAMES M. BRANDEN, New York, New York, *for Defendant-*  
14 *Appellant*.

15 KEARSE, *Circuit Judge*:

16 Defendant William F. Boyland, Jr. ("Boyland"), appeals from a judgment entered in  
17 the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York following a jury trial before  
18 Sandra L. Townes, *Judge*, convicting him on 21 counts of public-corruption-related offenses, to wit:  
19 Hobbs Act extortion conspiracy and attempted extortion, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (Counts  
20 One, Two, Sixteen, and Eighteen), conspiracy to commit bribery and to violate the Travel Act, in  
21 violation of *id.* § 371 (Counts Three and Seventeen), bribery in violation of *id.* § 666(a)(1)(B) (Counts

1 Four and Nineteen), honest-services wire fraud conspiracy and honest-services mail fraud conspiracy,  
2 in violation of *id.* § 1349 (Counts Five and Twenty-One), 10 counts of honest-services wire fraud, in  
3 violation of *id.* § 1343 (Counts Six-Fifteen), and theft of government property in violation of *id.*  
4 § 666(a)(1)(A) (Count Twenty). He was sentenced principally to 168 months' imprisonment, to be  
5 followed by a three-year term of supervised release, and was ordered to forfeit \$169,410.14 and to pay  
6 \$155,610.14 in restitution.

7 On appeal, Boyland challenges his conviction, contending primarily that the jury  
8 instructions with respect to Counts One through Nineteen were erroneous in light of *McDonnell v.*  
9 *United States*, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016), which narrowed the interpretation of "official act" within the  
10 meaning of the federal bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(3), as effectively incorporated in sections  
11 prohibiting *quid pro quo* corruption. He also argues that certain evidence was improperly admitted  
12 at trial. The government concedes that, in light of *McDonnell*, the instructions on Counts Five through  
13 Fifteen, the honest-services wire fraud counts, were erroneous. For the reasons that follow, we  
14 conclude that the trial court's instructions on Counts Three, Four, Seventeen, and Nineteen through  
15 Twenty One were not erroneous; that the instructions on the Hobbs Act and honest-services wire fraud  
16 counts, to which defendant did not object at trial, do not meet the "plain error" standard; and that  
17 Boyland's other contentions provide no basis for reversal.

18 I. BACKGROUND

19 At the times pertinent to this prosecution, Boyland was an elected member of the New  
20 York State Assembly, representing the 55th Assembly District, an area that includes the Brownsville,

1 Bedford-Stuyvesant, Crown Heights, and Bushwick sections of Brooklyn. In the 21-count superseding  
2 indictment (the "Indictment") Boyland was charged principally with engaging in honest-services wire  
3 fraud, in schemes to, *inter alia*, solicit bribes in connection with a proposed carnival and in connection  
4 with a proposed real estate venture for which New York State ("State") grant monies were to be  
5 obtained.

6 The government's evidence at Boyland's several-week trial, the sufficiency of which  
7 is not challenged on appeal, included numerous audio and video recordings--the accuracy of which  
8 was stipulated (*see* Trial Transcript ("Tr.") 87-91)--as well as emails and documents; testimony by  
9 Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") special agents Brian Getson and Sean Quinn, who operated  
10 undercover in meeting with Boyland and his aides in connection with schemes through which Boyland  
11 and the undercover agents were to receive New York City ("City") permits or State monies; testimony  
12 by numerous other witnesses as to the precise mechanics of those schemes; and testimony by Ry-Ann  
13 Hermon, Boyland's then-chief of staff who, prior to Boyland's trial, had pleaded guilty to bribery and  
14 extortion charges. The trial evidence, taken in the light most favorable to the government, included  
15 the following.

16 A. *The Evidence*

17 Getson testified that in August 2010, Alan Weiner--a carnival promoter who had passed  
18 away before Boyland's trial, but who in 2010-2011 was working with the government after pleading  
19 guilty to charges relating to bribing public officials--contacted Boyland, with whom he had had a  
20 relationship for several years, and offered Boyland money in exchange for helping to secure permits  
21 for a carnival to be held in Boyland's Brooklyn assembly district. (*See* Tr. 77-78.) Getson testified

1 (without objection) that he learned that "Boyland responded that," "[i]n exchange for his assistance  
2 getting carnivals in the assembly district," "he would be willing to take money from a nonprofit"  
3 corporation. (*Id.* at 78.)

4 Weiner thereafter introduced Boyland to Getson, who was posing as a Philadelphia  
5 promoter of carnivals and real estate businesses who was willing to pay bribes as a means of doing  
6 business. All of the meetings Getson had with Boyland and/or his representatives were recorded. (*See*  
7 *id.* at 85.)

8           1.     *The Carnival Scheme*

9           In order to operate a carnival on City-owned property, an owner must obtain various  
10 licenses and permits from the relevant City agencies. Getson was introduced to Boyland by Weiner  
11 in August 2010 at Boyland's district office, and the three discussed the process of "secur[ing] the  
12 property" (Government Exhibit ("GX") T-301, at 3) on which Getson and Weiner claimed to want to  
13 hold a carnival--a site on Rockaway Avenue in Brownsville--meaning obtaining the necessary permits  
14 for that property.

15           City agency approval is facilitated by letters of support from local elected officials. At  
16 that meeting, Boyland stated he would "have this thing locked up" and "have the okays done . . . by  
17 early next week" (*id.* at 4), as the Rockaway property was owned by the City; Getson testified he  
18 understood this to mean that Boyland would "get the okays" from "whatever city agencies would have  
19 control over that property at Rockaway" (Tr. 101).

1                   In October 2010, Getson, Boyland, and Weiner had a dinner meeting. Boyland  
 2 indicated that approval would be forthcoming from the City's Department of Housing Preservation and  
 3 Development ("HPD"), a relevant agency that had not been identified at their prior meeting. (*See*  
 4 Tr. 108-10.) Boyland said, "So guys, how do we do business? What's our next steps here? . . . How  
 5 do we do business? What's our next steps here? . . . 'Cause we got HPD. HPD is locked up. We're  
 6 there." (GX T-302, at 1.)

7                   Later in the conversation, Boyland said he would be running for reelection in 2012 (*id.*  
 8 at 15-16), and Weiner responded, "Obviously, obviously you will get support from us" (*id.* at 16),  
 9 leading to the following colloquy:

10                  [Boyland]: Yeah? We are just in a money raising mode right now.

11                  [Getson]: What can we do for you in that regard?

12                  [Boyland]: Well I'll get you something. We're just in this . . . I've got  
 13 something coming on the 28th. It's a . . . We gotta . . . On this end, it is not a big  
 14 deal. We have about a 100 grand we have to have in the pot. You know that  
 15 is just to sustain ourselves and help others around us because that is the name  
 16 of the game, of course, and, um, building. We will have all kinds of  
 17 conversations about it but that is the number at this point.

18                  (*Id.*)

19                  Boyland stated that he had found it more profitable to have fundraisers at small private  
 20 venues and "we are having something on the 28th. I'll send you an invite. You get your network to  
 21 come out and support it or whatever." (*Id.* at 16-17.) Getson testified that he asked whether Boyland  
 22 had any type of non-profit organization set up, and Boyland responded that he had four. Getson then  
 23 talked about compensating Boyland, "directly paying him for his assistance in helping us with the  
 24 carnivals," and that "Boyland's idea was some kind of consultancy or consulting agreement"

1 (Tr. 126-27):

2 [Getson]: What are, what are, so what are like in terms of like can I  
3 compensate you or whatever for helping us out or setting up the meetings for  
4 us what is the best kind of approach?

5 [Boyland]: Um, a consultancy, a consulting firm, folks we have  
6 worked with in the past. You know?

7 [Getson]: Yeah?

8 [Boyland]: You will be introduced to those guys.

9 (GX T-302, at 17.)

10 Four days later, Getson and Boyland spoke by telephone. Boyland said he had "all of  
11 the . . . information regarding the parks"; that he would soon "have okays on everything"; and that he  
12 was going to "send [Getson] the invite" for the fundraiser. (GX T-303, at 2.)

13 The following week, Getson received two emails from Boyland's office. One contained  
14 a lease application for the carnival. The other was an invitation to Boyland's October 28 fundraising  
15 event, with suggested contributions ranging from \$1,000 to \$3,800. (Tr. 143.) Getson attended the  
16 fundraiser and made a \$3,800 contribution, the maximum allowed for an individual contribution to  
17 a candidate for state election.

18 On November 3, 2010, Getson, Weiner and Boyland had another dinner meeting.  
19 Boyland announced that he had met with the new Parks president and that they "pretty much ha[d] the  
20 green light" for "anywhere we're gonna do [a carnival] in Brooklyn." (GX T-305, at 3.) Weiner  
21 suggested that the approval process would be expedited if Boyland were to write supporting letters  
22 directly to the licensing/permitting agencies. Boyland appeared to acquiesce.

1                   As the plans for the carnival progressed, however, Boyland began asking Getson for  
2 more money. For example, on January 17, 2011, Boyland told Getson by telephone that he was "a  
3 thousand dollars short on some gospel sponsorship for a band" and asked if Getson could provide him  
4 the money. (Tr. 213.) Getson agreed but stated that, due to logistics, he would be unable to do so  
5 until after the gospel event. At a dinner the following week, after assuring Getson that they were  
6 "[g]ood to go" with the city agencies and that he had completed the letter of support, Boyland again  
7 inquired about the money, asking if he could "have [his] girl [Hermon] call [Getson] about that gospel  
8 thing." (GX T-308, at 2, 32.) After Getson agreed (*see* Tr. at 257), Hermon contacted him in early  
9 February asking him for "\$2,000 for a bus trip to Albany" (Tr. 266). Thereafter, Getson received an  
10 invoice from Boyland's office in the amount of \$3,000.

11                  Getson paid that sum on February 17, 2011, outside of Boyland's office. He had come  
12 to the office to see Boyland; but Boyland's father--former Assemblyman William F. Boyland Sr.  
13 ("Frank Boyland")--was there and said, "[l]et's step outside and you and I'll take care of this. . . . You  
14 know how it is" (GX T-101, at 7). Thus, out on the sidewalk, Getson handed Boyland's father a  
15 \$3,000 check, with the payee line left blank. The elder Boyland, upon receiving the check for his son,  
16 said to Getson, "[J]ust legally, you know, you know[ ]this is against the law, right?" to which Getson  
17 responded, "[o]h, absolutely." (*Id.* at 10.)

18                  The two then reentered the building, and Getson saw Frank Boyland go back to  
19 Boyland's office. Getson then met with Boyland and Frank Boyland in Boyland's office to discuss the  
20 carnival plans. Boyland referred to letters of support that Weiner had previously drafted for Boyland's  
21 signature (*see, e.g.*, GX LC-2A (Boyland Letter to NYC Department of Consumer Affairs  
22 Commissioner Jonathan Mintz, dated February 24, 2011 ("vouch[ing]" for Weiner's experience "and

1 character"))) and said they were "good" (GX T-101, at 11). Getson then handed Boyland "fresh"  
 2 letters of support for Boyland to provide. (Tr. 303.) Boyland accepted the new drafts (*see* GX T-101,  
 3 at 12), which were thereafter typed on Assembly letterhead, signed by Boyland, and given to Weiner  
 4 (*see, e.g.*, GX LC-2E (Boyland Letter to Commissioner Mintz, dated March 8, 2011 ("I am writing  
 5 to express my strong support for these permits and request that you grant them expeditiously. . . I  
 6 know that you will look favorably on this application and grant your approval."))).

7 Getson testified that "almost immediately after this [February 17] meeting" he received  
 8 a call from Hermon, who stated that Boyland had put her on the carnival project in order to "expedite  
 9 everything through." (Tr. 331.) Indeed, Hermon had so stated in a voicemail message left on Getson's  
 10 phone shortly after the meeting, in which she "express[ed her] gratitude on behalf of Assemblyman  
 11 Boyland for [Getson's] assistance" on their projects. (GX T-311, at 1.) At trial, Hermon testified that  
 12 she attributed Boyland's instruction to expedite the carnival matter to the fact that Getson "gave  
 13 [Boyland] money." (Tr. 1603.)

14           2. *The Real Estate Scheme*

15 During an October 2010 telephone conversation with Getson about the carnival  
 16 application, Boyland said he was "looking for some investors" for a \$140 million hospital project in  
 17 his district. (GX T-303, at 3.) Twice thereafter, Getson mentioned that he had a "business partner"  
 18 who might be interested. Boyland said he would like to meet Getson's partner and that he had in mind  
 19 a site that might present a "good opportunity for [them] to get in and do some developing" (GX T-308,  
 20 at 5).

1                   Getson finally introduced Boyland and Quinn at a dinner in March 2011, and the three  
2 discussed possible real estate projects in Boyland's district. Boyland touted an abandoned hospital in  
3 his district, stating that the State's Department of Health had approved plans to recommission the  
4 hospital site. He estimated that it could be bought at a bargain price of 8 to 12 million dollars, and  
5 they discussed purchasing the property and then selling it back at a profit after the city formally  
6 approved the redevelopment.

7                   Getson testified that some 10 days later, Hermon called him to "ask for money on the  
8 Assemblyman's behalf," "\$7,000," to pay for a lawyer (Tr. 414, 416). Hermon termed this a "personal  
9 ask" from Boyland, not intended to "go[] towards the campaign." (*Id.* at 1665.) Boyland later said he  
10 preferred to receive the money in cash. Getson subsequently brought the cash to a meeting at  
11 Boyland's district office on March 25, 2011, saying that it would be from himself and Quinn (Tr. 430);  
12 Boyland responded that he understood, and commented that "[y]ou guys are business" (GX T-104A,  
13 at 6). Before paying Boyland, Getson said that he and Quinn wanted Boyland to "help [them] get . . .  
14 state grants" to cover expenses associated with investing in "brownfield" sites (*id.* at 7), meaning real  
15 estate plagued by an environmental issue that needs to be treated prior to development[Tr. 250];  
16 Boyland responded that "it's right here at home so it's a no-brainer" (*id.*). Interpreting this response  
17 to mean that securing state grants for real estate investments in Boyland's district was "something  
18 [Boyland] c[ould] do easily" (Tr. 433), Getson handed Boyland the \$7,000.

19                   A week later, Boyland gave Getson and Quinn a tour of the assembly district and  
20 pointed out various brownfield sites and the abandoned hospital they had previously discussed. Quinn  
21 reiterated his desire to buy the hospital property in anticipation of a profitable resale and asked  
22 Boyland "what kind of ways do you have to influence the city on the actual sale of the property?"

1 (GX T-107, at 48). Boyland cited his ability to steer state grants toward developments. (See  
2 GX T-107, at 67 ("the one thing that I can, I can probably, you know, more than likely, you know, uh,  
3 sell, is the sure thing when it comes to city and state financing and their support on the project").)

4 Quinn also inquired about the possibility of zoning changes to upgrade the  
5 neighborhood, and Boyland stated that such a task would "[n]ot [be] a problem" (*id.* at 25). Boyland  
6 further proposed demolishing certain buildings to create more uniformity in the area; when Quinn  
7 asked whether the contracts for these demolition projects could be granted to his associates, Boyland  
8 stated that that would be "[s]omething to do" (*id.* at 72), which Quinn understood to indicate that  
9 Boyland "positively thought [that] was a good idea" (Tr. 2160). Boyland also said that

10 the good thing about what we're, what we're proposing here is that everything  
11 we've seen I'm in control of. You know, I'm the politician. I'm the guy that can  
12 make the move over on this end so we know the, the, the folks that can pull  
13 the, you know, sort of triggers we're looking for.

14 (GX T-107, at 69.)

15 At their next meeting to discuss the real estate project, Boyland offered a slightly  
16 changed approach. While Getson and Quinn would still buy the property for roughly \$8 million,  
17 instead of selling it to the development company they would sell it to a non-profit Boyland controlled,  
18 "probably get[ting] 15 [million dollars]" for it. (GX T-120A, at 91.) Boyland also emphasized that  
19 he would still be able to deliver to Getson and Quinn the benefits that they had previously discussed,  
20 including: "writ[ing] you a couple of grants" (*id.* at 32) to help cover the costs of environmental  
21 remediation, awarding Quinn's associates the "demolition contracts" (*id.* at 77) worth several million  
22 dollars (*see* Tr. 2292), and "sew[ing] everything up" if there was ever a zoning issue (GX T-120A,

1 at 86). Boyland also embraced Quinn's idea of "bury[ing]" owners of the coveted properties in  
2 violations as a means of lowering the properties' value (*id.* at 35-36).

3 As to compensation for Boyland, Quinn suggested "put[ting] one of [his] people" on  
4 the staff of Boyland's non-profit entity as a no-show employee, allowing Boyland to retain his or her  
5 supposed salary, and Boyland said, "[w]e'll do it[,] [w]e'll do it." (*Id.* at 41.) Boyland also said,  
6 however, that he would expect to receive \$250,000 for his role in the project. (*See* Tr. 618.) After  
7 Quinn expressed some reluctance, Boyland vowed that he was fully committed to the project, noting  
8 that "if [he] had any kind of qualms about it, I'd still be in Brooklyn" (GX T-120A, at 91):

9 I understand what it takes to get these projects completed. Um, and I just, you  
10 know . . . shit, I just laid out my motherfuckin' pay line for you. It's where I am  
11 right now. I mean, what I want to do, my goal for myself is, like I said, over  
12 the next 3 to 4 years, work these projects, get them done.

13 (*Id.*)

14 Thereafter, neither Quinn nor Getson made any more payments to Boyland, although  
15 they did make a counteroffer to pay him \$5,000 for each bribable official he could attract to the real  
16 estate scheme. Boyland declined, and there were no further discussions of the real estate scheme.  
17 Boyland stated that the type of people he would bring would be worth considerably more than \$5,000.

18 3. *The Fraudulent Voucher Scheme*

19 The government presented multiple witnesses and exhibits to show that in 2007-2011,  
20 Boyland submitted to the State numerous requests for per diems and travel reimbursements for  
21 assembly district business trips that he did not take. For example, there were dates on which he

1 claimed such reimbursement for travel to and from Albany, New York, when instead he was in the  
2 Hamptons or out of the country on personal trips--or in New York City meeting with Getson or Quinn.  
3 The evidence showed that Boyland collected more than \$71,000 as a result of such fraudulent  
4 vouchers.

5 *4. Mail Fraud Conspiracy With Respect to the Nonprofit Entity*

6 Finally, the government presented evidence, principally through testimony by Hermon,  
7 that Boyland diverted more than \$56,000 of State funds to his own use. Members of the State  
8 Assembly are allotted moneys that they have discretion to have sent to nonprofit public-interest  
9 corporations. One to which Boyland had such funds sent was the nonprofit corporation Wayside  
10 Outreach and Development ("Wayside"). However, Hermon testified that Boyland essentially treated  
11 that money as "his money" (Tr. 1237) by, for example, having "Wayside[] . . . pay for large  
12 [campaign] events" (Tr. 1079).

13 *B. The Jury Instructions*

14 The district court instructed the jury as to the elements of each of the offenses that  
15 Boyland was alleged to have committed. To the extent pertinent to Boyland's contention that the  
16 instructions were not consistent with the honest-services fraud law as subsequently announced in  
17 *McDonnell*, the court's instructions included the following.

18 As to Counts Two and Eighteen, which alleged that Boyland had attempted to extort  
19 money under color of official right in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951, the jury was instructed that it

needed to find that Boyland had, *inter alia*, "used the authority of his office or position to obtain . . . money, goods or services," which the court equated with "represent[ing] him[self] as capable of doing something, or of refusing to do something, because of his official position." (Tr. 3110.) The court instructed that "[t]he focus of [that] inquiry" was "whether the money, goods or services were given to the defendant because of the defendant's mis[]use of his position," and whether "the defendant knew the giver's consent was wrongfully obtained -- that is, that the money, goods or services were given in connection with the defendant's misuse of his official position rather than being given voluntarily." (Tr. 3111-12.) The court told the jury that these principles also applied to Counts One and Sixteen, which alleged extortion conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). (*See* Tr. 3115-17.)

The instructions on Counts Six through Fifteen, charging honest-services wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343, likewise highlighted the relevance of Boyland's elected position to the charge. In the course of instructing the jury on the first element the government needed to prove-- "[t]hat the defendant knowingly devised or participated in a scheme to defraud the public of its right to the honest services of a public official through bribery or kickbacks" (Tr. 3143)--the court stated the following:

A public official owes a duty of honest and faithful service to the public he served and [to] his public employer. When a public official solicits, agrees to receive or receives a corrupt payment for or because of official action, the official has breached his duty of honest and faithful disinterested service. The term "official act" includes the decisions o[r] actions generally expected of a public official, including but not limited to contacting or lobbying other governmental agencies, and advocating for his constituents.

(Tr. 3144.) The court stated that this principle was also applicable to Count Five, conspiracy to commit honest-services fraud. (*See* Tr. 3150.)

1                   The court's instructions on the remaining counts, apart from a stray reference to an  
2 "official act" in the course of describing an illegitimate defense to a federal programs bribery charge  
3 (*see* Tr. 3126) and an overview of what amounts to bribery under New York law (*see* Tr. 3134-37),  
4 did not discuss actions taken in an official capacity as being a prerequisite for conviction.

5                   C. *The Verdict*

6                   The jury found Boyland guilty on all 21 counts charged in the Indictment. Boyland was  
7 sentenced as indicated above. This appeal followed.

8                   II. DISCUSSION

9                   On appeal, Boyland challenges his conviction, contending principally that the jury  
10 charge as to Counts One through Nineteen was erroneous in light of the Supreme Court's subsequent  
11 decision in *McDonnell*, 136 S. Ct. 2355, which narrowed the interpretation of "official act" within the  
12 meaning of the federal bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(3), as effectively incorporated in sections  
13 prohibiting *quid pro quo* corruption. He acknowledges that he did not object to the instructions but  
14 argues that he is entitled to relief upon plain-error review. Boyland also challenges some of the trial  
15 court's evidentiary rulings.

16                   The government concedes that the district court's unobjected-to instructions on Counts  
17 Five through Fifteen, the 11 honest-services fraud counts, were erroneous in light of *McDonnell*, but  
18 it contends that the error does not warrant relief under plain-error analysis. And it argues that the

1 court's other instructions were not affected by *McDonnell* and that there were no evidentiary or other  
2 errors.

3 For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the "plain error" standard is not met; and  
4 we find no basis for reversal in defendant's other contentions.

5 *A. The Plain-Error Standard*

6 The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure allow limited review of an unpreserved error  
7 pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b), if it meets specific criteria. As stated by the Supreme Court,

8 Rule 52(b) permits an appellate court to recognize a "plain error that  
9 affects substantial rights," even if the claim of error was "not brought" to the  
10 district court's "attention." Lower courts, of course, must apply the Rule as this  
11 Court has interpreted it. And the cases that set forth our interpretation hold  
12 that an appellate court may, in its discretion, correct an error not raised at trial  
13 only where the appellant demonstrates that (1) there is an "error"; (2) the error  
14 is "clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute"; (3) the error  
15 "affected the appellant's substantial rights, which in the ordinary case means"  
16 it "affected the outcome of the district court proceedings"; and (4) "the error  
17 seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial  
18 proceedings."

19 *United States v. Marcus*, 560 U.S. 258, 262 (2010) (quoting *Puckett v. United States*, 556 U.S. 129,  
20 135 (2009)); see, e.g., *United States v. Olano*, 507 U.S. 725, 731-37 (1993); *Johnson v. United States*,  
21 520 U.S. 461, 466-67 (1997); *United States v. Cotton*, 535 U.S. 625, 631-32 (2002). The *Marcus*  
22 Court emphasized that

23 [t]he third criterion specifies that a "plain error" must "affec[t]" the appellant's  
24 "substantial rights." In the ordinary case, to meet this standard an error must  
25 be "prejudicial," which means that there must be a reasonable probability that  
26 the error affected the outcome of the trial,

1        *Marcus*, 560 U.S. at 262 (quoting *Olano*, 507 U.S. at 734-35), and that the "fourth 'plain error'

2        criterion . . . permits an appeals court to recognize 'plain error' only if the error 'seriously affect[s] the

3        fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings,'" *Marcus*, 560 U.S. at 265 (quoting

4        *Johnson*, 520 U.S. at 467).

5              The burden of meeting the above criteria for relief under plain-error analysis is on the

6        defendant. *See, e.g.*, *United States v. Dominguez Benitez*, 542 U.S. 74, 82 (2004). The government

7        may point to parts of the record in an effort to counter any ostensible showing of prejudice the

8        defendant may make. *See, e.g.*, *United States v. Young*, 470 U.S. 1, 16 (1985).

9              Boyland argues that, where the error a defendant raises on appeal results from a

10        supervening Supreme Court decision, we should apply the modified version of the plain error test

11        discussed in *United States v. Viola*, 35 F.3d 37, 41-43 (2d Cir. 1994) ("*Viola*"), *abrogated on other*

12        *grounds by Salinas v. United States*, 522 U.S. 52 (1997). On the basis that in such a scenario the

13        defendant would not have been sufficiently on notice to have objected to the error at trial, the modified

14        plain error test would shift the burden to the government to demonstrate that the defendant did not

15        suffer prejudice. *See Viola*, 35 F.3d at 41-43. In the wake of *Johnson v. United States*, 520 U.S. 461,

16        469-70 (1997), we have acknowledged doubt as to the continued viability of the modified plain error

17        test but have not had the need to address it. *See, e.g.*, *United States v. Prado*, 815 F.3d 93, 102-03 (2d

18        Cir. 2016). We similarly decline to address its continued viability here because, regardless of which

19        party bears the burden with respect to the prejudice prong, we are convinced that Boyland did not

20        suffer any prejudice.

## 1       B. McDonnell

2                  In *McDonnell*, the government and the defendant former governor of Virginia had  
 3       agreed that, for purposes of considering whether a public official committed honest-services wire  
 4       fraud and Hobbs Act extortion, the jury should determine whether the official, in exchange for loans  
 5       or gifts, performed "official act[s]" as that term is defined in the federal bribery statute, 18 U.S.C.  
 6       § 201(a)(3). *See* 136 S. Ct. at 2365. The Supreme Court ruled that, in instructing the jury, the trial  
 7       court had interpreted that term too expansively. *See id.* at 2374.

8                  The *McDonnell* Court held that, in order to prove that the defendant performed an  
 9       official act as that term is defined in § 201, the government must prove two factors. First it must  
 10      identify "a 'question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy' that 'may at any time be pending'  
 11      or 'may by law be brought' before a public official" that would involve "a formal exercise of  
 12      governmental power, such as a lawsuit, hearing, or administrative determination." *McDonnell*, 136  
 13      S. Ct. at 2368 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(3)). The Court noted that the subject of whether a state-  
 14      created commission "would 'allocate grant money for'" a briber's desired project "qualif[ies] as [a]  
 15      question[] or matter[] under § 201(a)(3)," as that is an issue that "is focused and concrete, and . . .  
 16      involves a formal exercise of governmental power that is similar in nature to a lawsuit, administrative  
 17      determination, or hearing." *McDonnell*, 136 S. Ct. at 2370.

18                  Second, the government must prove that "the public official made a decision or took  
 19      an action 'on' that question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding, or controversy, or agreed to do so."  
 20      *McDonnell*, 136 S. Ct. at 2368. The Court ruled that these criteria are not met by proof merely that  
 21      an official hosted an event, meeting, or speech "related to" a pending question or matter. *Id.* at 2370.

1                   Nonetheless, the Court stated that while "setting up a meeting, calling another public  
2 official, or hosting an event does not, standing alone, qualify as an 'official act,'" *id.* at 2368, such  
3 actions "could serve as evidence of an agreement to take an official act," *id.* at 2371. And a jury would  
4 be entitled to "conclude that an agreement was reached if the evidence shows that the public official  
5 received a thing of value knowing that it was given with the expectation that the official would  
6 perform an 'official act' in return." *Id.* Further, the Court noted that the government is not required  
7 to prove that the defendant official actually performed the agreed task; it is enough for purposes of the  
8 federal bribery statute to show that the official "agree[d]" to make a decision or take an action. *Id.*  
9 at 2370-71. In addition, § 201 would be violated by an agreement to "us[e one's] official position to  
10 exert pressure on *another* official to perform an 'official act.'" *McDonnell*, 136 S. Ct. at 2370  
11 (emphasis in original). If a public official agrees to "use[] his official position to provide advice to  
12 another official, knowing or intending that such advice will form the basis for an 'official act' by  
13 another official, that too can qualify as a decision or action for purposes of § 201(a)(3)." *McDonnell*,  
14 136 S. Ct. at 2370.

15                  C. *The Instructions in the Present Case*

16                  Most of the counts against Boyland involved assessment of whether what he offered  
17 or sold amounted to an "official act," though some did not.

1       1. *Honest-Services Fraud: Counts Five Through Fifteen*

2                  We agree with the parties that the district court's honest-services charge with respect  
 3 to Counts Five through Fifteen in this case did not meet the standards set by *McDonnell*. The district  
 4 court instructed the jury, *inter alia*, that an official act encompassed "decisions o[r] actions generally  
 5 expected of a public official, *including but not limited to contacting or lobbying other governmental  
 6 agencies*, and advocating for his constituents." (Tr. 3144 (emphasis added).) As *McDonnell* makes  
 7 clear, however, "[s]etting up a meeting, talking to another official, or organizing an event (or agreeing  
 8 to do so)--without more--does not fit th[e] definition of 'official act.'" *McDonnell*, 136 S. Ct. at 2372.  
 9 The instruction that merely "contacting . . . other governmental agencies" qualified as an official act  
 10 for purposes of § 1343 was therefore erroneous in light of *McDonnell*.

11       2. *Hobbs Act Extortion: Counts One, Two, Sixteen, and Eighteen*

12                  While the government does not similarly concede that there was error in the  
 13 instructions given to the jury with respect to the alleged Hobbs Act extortion offenses (whether  
 14 attempted (Counts Two and Eighteen) or conspiratorial (Counts One and Sixteen)), we are inclined  
 15 to view these instructions also as flawed. With respect to the honest-services wire fraud counts, both  
 16 sides had requested instructions that included the terms by which § 201(a)(3) defines "official act."  
 17 But their proposed instructions with respect to the Hobbs Act counts did not include that language,  
 18 and the jury was told that in order to convict on these counts it needed to find that Boyland knew that  
 19 any money he accepted "was offered in exchange for a specific exercise of [Boyland's] official  
 20 powers" (Tr. 3111). *McDonnell* concerned the meaning of "official act" as used in 18 U.S.C.

1       § 201(a)(3) because the parties agreed to use that definition for purposes of instructing the jury as to  
2       both honest-services fraud and Hobbs Act extortion. *See McDonnell*, 136 S. Ct. at 2365. However,  
3       in addition to considering Congressional intent, the Court's analysis turned upon constitutional  
4       concerns stemming from the breadth of the interpretation advanced by the government. *See id.*  
5       at 2372-73. Particularly troubling to the Court was the possibility of criminal penalties for innocuous  
6       conduct by government officials attempting to serve their constituents. *See id.* at 2372. We believe  
7       that the instructions provided to the jury here with regard to Hobbs Act extortion, not explicitly  
8       incorporating the definition of "official act" in 18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(3), suffered from the same flaws,  
9       in that they did not sufficiently inform the jury as to the nature of the power that the government was  
10      required to prove the defendant exercised or promised to exercise. The jury could have believed, as  
11      with the counts of honest-services wire fraud, that merely contacting another government agency  
12      sufficed to constitute a misuse of his "official powers."

13                   3. *Federal Funds Bribery: Counts Four, Seventeen, and Nineteen*

14                   We do not reach the same conclusion with respect to the instructions given for Counts  
15      Four, Seventeen, and Nineteen, alleging bribery and bribery conspiracy with respect to the carnival  
16      and real estate schemes, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 666. That section is more expansive than § 201,  
17      in which "official act[s]" are limited to acts on pending "question[s], matter[s], cause[s], suit[s],  
18      proceeding[s], or controver[ies]," 18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(3). Section 666 prohibits individuals from  
19      "solicit[ing] . . . anything of value from any person, *intending to be influenced* or rewarded *in*  
20      *connection with any business, transaction, or series of transactions of [an] organization, government,*

1 or agency." 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B) (emphases added). We do not see that the *McDonnell* standard  
2 applied to these counts.

3           4. *Voucher Fraud and Other Conspiracy: Counts Three, Twenty, and Twenty-One*

4                 The remaining three counts, alleging conspiracy to commit bribery and violate the  
5 Travel Act (Count Three), voucher fraud (Count Twenty), and mail fraud conspiracy (Count Twenty-  
6 One), likewise do not depend on the meaning of official act under § 201(a)(3). We do not see error  
7 in the instructions on these counts.

8           D. *Effect on Boyland's Substantial Rights*

9                 While the instructions with respect to the honest-services fraud and Hobbs Act  
10 extortion counts were erroneous in light of the standard set by *McDonnell*, we cannot conclude that  
11 the errors affected Boyland's substantial rights. The carnival and real estate schemes to which Boyland  
12 agreed with Getson and Quinn were concrete matters that, in order to proceed as planned, required  
13 formal governmental decisions. City licenses and permits were required for the operation of a  
14 carnival. And City or State approvals were required in order to secure grant money, to award the  
15 contemplated demolition contracts, and to enact zoning changes. All of these approvals would require  
16 the formal exercise of governmental power.

17                 Boyland promised that he would ensure that all of the necessary governmental actions  
18 occurred. For example, with respect to the carnival scheme, he stated that he already had the City's

1 HPD "locked up" and that its approval would be forthcoming. He undertook to provide letters to the  
2 Commissioner of the City's Department of Consumer Affairs ("DCA") that "vouch[ed]" for Weiner's  
3 character (GX LC-2A); Boyland expressed his "strong support for these permits[,] . . . request[ing]  
4 that [DCA] grant them expeditiously"; and he stated, "I know that you will look favorably on this  
5 application and grant your approval" (GX LC-2E).

6 Similarly, with respect to the real estate scheme, Boyland assured Getson and Quinn  
7 that he would get them State grant money for the renovation of the building, would have zoning  
8 changes implemented, and would see that Quinn's associates were awarded lucrative demolition  
9 contracts. While making these promises and assuring Getson and Quinn that he had locked up  
10 approvals for the carnival scheme, Boyland was, as described in Parts I.A.2. and I.A.1. above, asking  
11 Getson and Quinn for money for various of his projects or for his personal use.

12 In sum, all of Boyland's dealings with Getson and Quinn involved concrete matters  
13 that, in order to proceed, needed to be brought before public officials or agencies that would have to  
14 make formal and focused administrative decisions. In connection with each matter, Boyland agreed  
15 to ensure that favorable governmental decisions would be made, whether for licensing, work contracts,  
16 zoning, or funding. Although the jury was not instructed as to its need to find that the matters were  
17 concrete, that they required focused governmental decisions, and that Boyland took action on these  
18 matters, we see no reasonable possibility, in light of the record as a whole, that that flaw affected the  
19 outcome of the case.

#### E. Other Arguments

Boyland's other arguments lack merit and do not warrant extended discussion. They include a claim that his convictions on Counts Twenty and Twenty-One should be vacated on the ground of prejudicial spillover from counts as to which we have concluded that Boyland is not entitled to relief on plain-error review, and a challenge to the admission of certain testimony by the undercover FBI agents on a ground Boyland did not mention in the district court.

## CONCLUSION

We have considered all of Boyland's arguments on this appeal and have found in them no basis for reversal. The judgment of the district court is affirmed.